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Notes on a comment on 2-efficiency and the Banzhaf value
Nowak [1] proposed a characterization of the Banzhaf value in the class of transferable utility games by means of 2-
efficiency, dummy player, symmetry, and marginality properties. Recently, Casajus [2] proposed a new characterization
of the Banzhaf value by means of only two properties, namely, 2-efficiency and dummy player properties. As pointed out
in [2], this suggests that some properties in Nowak’s characterization are redundant. In this note we show that this is not
the case, by pointing out the differences between the two formulations of the 2-efficiency property. First, we present several
definitions to make this comment self-contained.
A cooperative gamewith transferable utility (a game) is a pair (N, v), whereN is a finite set of players andv, the characteristic
function, a real-valued function on 2N = {S : S ⊆ N} with v(∅) = 0. Denote by G the set of all games. Take a finite set of
players N and a coalition S ⊆ N . Denote by (N, uS) the unanimity game of S given by uS(T ) = 1 if S ⊆ T and uS(T ) = 0
otherwise. By a valuewe mean a map f that assigns a vector f (N, v) ∈ R|N| to every game (N, v) ∈ G. The Banzhaf value [3,
4] is defined for every (N, v) ∈ G and i ∈ N by Bai(N, v) = 2−|N|+1S⊆N\{i} [v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)]. Take a game (N, v) ∈ G.
A player i ∈ N is a dummy player in (N, v) if, for every S ⊆ N \ {i}, v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S) + v({i}). Two players i, j ∈ N are
symmetric in (N, v) if, for all S ⊆ N \ {i, j}, v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S ∪ {j}).
In order to present the 2-efficiency properties, two different reduced games that have been defined in the literature need
to be introduced. In both cases the number of agents decreases by 1, but the set of agents and, hence, the characteristic
function, are different. Let us formalize their construction.
Take (N, v) ∈ G and i, j ∈ N with i ≠ j. Let the set {i, j} be considered as a new player p ∉ N . DefineNp = (N \{i, j})∪{p}.
The {ij}-merged game (Np, vp) ∈ G is defined for every S ⊆ Np by vp(S) = v((S \ {p}) ∪ {i, j}) if p ∈ S and vp(S) = v(S)
otherwise. Next, define Ni▹j = N \ {j}. The {i ▹ j}-amalgamation game (Ni▹j, vi▹j) ∈ G is defined for every S ⊆ Ni▹j by
vi▹j(S) = v(S ∪ {j}) if i ∈ S and vi▹j(S) = v(S) otherwise.
The {ij}-merged game was first defined in [5]. It considers that a pair of players merge or unite in a new player p which
lies outside the original set of players. To our knowledge, the {i ▹ j}-amalgamation game was first defined in [6]. In the
{i ▹ j}-amalgamation game, player j delegates his/her role to player i, who belongs to the original set of players. Thus, the
two games are different, since the sets of players are different. Finally, note that we can establish a bijection π : Np → Ni▹j
such that vp = vi▹j ◦ π .
Next we present the properties we will analyze. For the sake of clarity of exposition, we name each 2-efficiency property
in a different way according to the game used.
2ME A value, f , satisfies 2-merging efficiency if, for every (N, v) ∈ G and i, j ∈ N ,
fp(Np, vp) = fi(N, v)+ fj(N, v).
2AE A value, f , satisfies 2-amalgamation efficiency if, for every (N, v) ∈ G and i, j ∈ N ,
fi(Ni▹j, vi▹j) = fi(N, v)+ fj(N, v).
II A value, f , satisfies isomorphism invariance if, for every bijection π : N → N ′, every game (N, v) ∈ G, and i ∈ N ,
fi(N, v) = fπ(i)(N ′, v ◦ π−1).
In order to characterize the Banzhaf value, Nowak [1] used the 2ME property while Casajus [2] used the 2AE property. It
is clear that, if a value satisfies II, then 2ME and 2AE are equivalent properties. Casajus [2] showed that 2AE implies II (see
Theorem 1 in [2]). Thus, 2AE implies 2ME. However, if a value is sensitive to the labels of the agents, it may satisfy 2ME but
not 2AE, as the next example shows.
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Example 1. Let a, b be two distinct, fixed, and indivisible players. By indivisible we mean that there is no pair of players i, j
such that {i, j} = a or {i, j} = b. Let g1 be the value defined for every (N, v) ∈ G by
• If N = {a, b},
g1a (N, v) =
3
4
(v(N)− v({b}))+ 1
4
v({a})
g1b (N, v) =
1
4
(v(N)− v({a}))+ 3
4
v({b})
• Otherwise g1(N, v) = Ba(N, v).
The value g1 satisfies 2ME because agents a and b are particular indivisible agents. However, g1 violates II. Take any
bijection π : {a, b} → {i, j}, where {i, j} ≠ {a, b}, and take the unanimity game ({a, b}, u{a,b}). Then, g1a ({a, b}, u{a,b}) ≠
g1π(a)({i, j}, u{a,b} ◦ π−1). Thus, by Theorem 1 in [6], g1 does not satisfy 2AE. 
Finally, we present threemore properties used in [1] in order to check that there is no redundancy in his characterization
of the Banzhaf value.
D A value, f , satisfies the dummy player property if, for every game (N, v) ∈ G and every dummy player i ∈ N in (N, v),
fi(N, v) = v({i}).
S A value, f , satisfies symmetry if, for every game (N, v) ∈ G and every pair of symmetric players i, j ∈ N in (N, v),
fi(N, v) = fj(N, v).
M A value, f , satisfiesmarginality if, for every pair of games (N, v), (N, w) ∈ G, and every player i ∈ N such that, for every
S ⊆ N \ {i}, v(S ∪ {i})− v(S) = w(S ∪ {i})− w(S),
fi(N, v) = fi(N, w).
Proposition 1. Properties 2ME, S, D, and M are independent.
Proof. • The Shapley value, Sh, defined for every (N, v) ∈ G and i ∈ N by Shi(N, v) =S⊆N\{i} s!(n−s−1)!n! [v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)],
satisfies all the properties but 2ME.
• The value g1 defined in Example 1 above satisfies all the properties but S.
• The null value, 0, defined for every (N, v) ∈ G and i ∈ N by 0i(N, v) = 0, satisfies all the properties but D.
• Let a, b be two distinct, fixed, and indivisible players. The value g2 defined for every (N, v) ∈ G by
g2(N, v) =

0 if (N, v) = ({a, b}, δ{a})
Ba(N, v) otherwise
satisfies all the properties but M.1 
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1 Let N be a finite set of players and S ⊆ N . Denote by (N, δS) the Dirac game of S defined by δS(S) = 1 and δS(T ) = 0 for every T ≠ S.
Alonso-Meijide et al. [7] provide a characterization of the Banzhaf–Owen coalitional value. In that work, the independence of the properties used is
proved. Embarrassingly, the counterexample proposed in item (iv) of Remark 3.4 (see [7]) is not valid to check the independence. Nevertheless, a similar
solution to g2 can be considered in that framework.
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